Introduction
Academic literature in the area of international relations has historically portrayed the European Union (EU) as a distinctive international actor. Popular conceptual frameworks for the EU's foreign policy action, such as 'Civilian Power Europe' and 'Normative Power Europe' contend that, unlike to traditional powers, the EU seeks to influence the international community through the dissemination of supposedly universal norms and value achieved by non-coercive and cooperative means. Such distinctiveness is, however, increasingly being contested by international relations and legal scholars; with some claiming that the EU's claims to universalism are based on a misguided conflation between European and universal norms, whilst others contend that the EU's power is purely a function of its economic power.
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This article joins the chorus of arguments that claim that the EU's foreign policy power is non-distinctive. It does so by focusing on an important feature of the EU's trade policy, the role of World Trade organization (WTO) dispute settlement in the EU's attempts to promote its interests and norms abroad. It argues, in particular, that WTO litigation is a key tool used by the EU not only to further its economic interests but also to promote regulatory positions and values that purely reflect its specific domestic preferences. In light of this, the article posits that the EU operates as a traditional and pragmatic foreign policy power, which is, inter alia, not adverse to promoting its self-interest.
Section II provides a descriptive overview of the various roles ascribed in the international relations theory to the EU as a foreign policy actor. Section III generally examines the dynamic relationship between the WTO litigation and EU domestic policy making and the extent to which WTO dispute settlement has become an important feature of the EU's attempts achieve its goals and influence international law. Section IV addresses two case studies illustrating how WTO dispute settlement is factored into the EU's internal and external regulatory policy making process in order to ensure that its interests and values are externalised. The first of these addresses the EU's current policy with respect to access to mineral resources, which led to two WTO rulings prohibiting import restrictions imposed by China on raw materials and rare earths. The second case study focuses on the EU's legislation banning trade in seal products -designed to compel States engaged in seal hunting to change their hunting practices in accordance with the EU's domestic preferenceswhich was recently contested before the WTO judicature. Section V argues, in light of the case studies addressed in this article, that rather than shaping international law through non-coercive means and by promoting universal values and norms, the EU protects and projects its own interests and preferences by using its significant economic power to write the rules of the game in its favour.
The EU's Identity as Foreign Policy Power
The progressive rise of the EU (then the European Economic Community) as a global actor in the second half of the twentieth century brought into question many of the commonly held preconceptions as to how power and influence could be exercised in the context of international relations. Power-based politics (or 'hard power') based on military coercion and associated with nation-states such as the United States (US) did not adequately reflect the manner in which the EU has typically sought to influence the international community. Because of the absence of ! 3! any military capability of note, economic policy, diplomacy and cooperation, rather than the military might and unilateral action which characterize the US's approach to foreign policy 1 , have historically been the main tools used by the EU to further its interests abroad. The first attempt by international relations scholars to capture the distinctive identity of the EU drew a sharp contrast with the military and unilateral inclinations of the US. The EU was said to represent a new breed of international actor -a 'civilian power' 2 based on the fulfillment of three fundamental criteria: "a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military power, primarily economic, means to secure national goals [….]; and c) a willingness to develop supranational superstructures to address critical issues of international management" 3 . Contrary to the US then, cooperation and deliberation were the means through which the EU would influence others, and it would do so by promoting international law and institutions
One of the criticisms aimed at this Civilian Power Europe was that it seeks to understand the EU's role in international relations through the prism of traditional Westphalian concepts concerning statehood and power 4 . Underpinning the idea of Civilian Power Europe was the assumption that the EU was forced to find alternative means to wield power because it did not have the military capabilities of a nation- Europe is based on two key components of the EU's external action 6 . Firstly, there is the EU's commitment to disseminate a set of core norms (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law) and minor norms (social solidarity, antidiscrimination, sustainable development and good governance) 7 , which are reflective of its own identity rather than its self-interest. Secondly, the practices through which the EU promotes these norms must reflect the EU's fundamental values. For example, the EU should not coerce others into complying with its norms but rather engage with them in processes of deliberation and discussion, nor should it impose on third countries disciplines that it does not comply with itself 8 . In other words, Normative Power is not simply a narrative a self-projection, whereby the EU exercises power by exporting its normative identity abroad, but also part of a longterm project to create a "more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people in the actual conditions of their lives should" 9 , and which "must be based on more universally accepted values and principles that can be explained to both Europeans and non-European alike" 10 .
The obvious counterpoint to these conceptualizations of the EU as a foreign policy actor is the idea of the United States as an 'exceptionalist' (that is, as an international actor that sees itself as inherently superior and strives to ensure that international law reflects its values and norms) and as an exemptionalist (that is, an international actor that is above the strictures of international law meaning, for example, that the pursuance of national goals can fully justify recourse to unilateralism) 11 . This would contrast with the idea of the EU as a civilian or normative actor promoting universal norms and values and attached to the pooling of sovereignty through international institutions. On this point, Manners posits that the absence of any claims to exceptionalism is a critical feature of the EU's normative action and that the supposedly 'universal norms' that the EU exports as well as its commitment to "non-hierarchical relationships" 12 are all informed by the EU's historical mistakes (e.g., colonialism) rather than a conviction based on any supposed innate superiority 13 . However, such distinctions are increasingly being contested with some arguing that exceptionalism, exemptionalism and unilateralism are not features that are unique to the US but are also verified in the EU's foreign policy practice 14 . A particular point of criticism relates to the suggestion under Normative Power Europe that the EU differs from other foreign policy powers insofar as its actions are driven by a propensity to promote fundamental norms and values that are not based on self-interest. This supposed virtuousness of the EU was recently rejected by De Burca's conceptualization the EU's 'governance mode' of foreign policy according to which the distinctiveness of the EU's foreign policy lies not in the substance of the policy but rather the manner in which such policy is conducted 15 . De
Burca argues that what truly sets apart the EU from other international actors is that in promoting its values and interest it has a clear preference "for the creation of stable, long-term, institutionalized relationships with other states and entities, and frequent use of regulatory frameworks involving common articulated goals and broad participation to regulate and coordinate policy externally". In that sense, De Burca's 'governance mode' conceptualization differs from Normative Power by avoiding any claim regarding the virtuousness of the EU's external action argung that the EU's default setting is to promote collective action and decision-making processes.
Yet, it is by no means evident that unilateralism plays second fiddle to collective or cooperative action in the context of the EU's external relations. In this respect, Bradford has highlighted the power that is wielded by the EU through the so-called "Brussels effect" 16 which describes the EU's power to unilaterally regulate global markets. Whether in the area of competition law, data protection of chemical safety standards, Bradford demonstrates that third countries are compelled to follow the regulatory template set by the EU -however stringent these may be -in order to maintain the ability to access the EU's lucrative market. In the Brussels effect, the EU's global regulatory power manifests itself as almost an accidental byproduct of the EU's economic power. But there is evidence that the EU is deliberately designing its regulations to govern the actions of persons and situations beyond its borders.
For example, Scott has conducted a legal analysis of EU rules on climate change, air and transport services and financial services, demonstrating that the EU increasingly resorts to the practice of "territorial extension" 17 whereby its laws can apply to circumstances and conduct which take place abroad as long as jurisdiction is triggered by the establishment of a territorial connection.
A recent conceptual framework for the EU as a foreign policy power, developed by Damro, does away with the problematic debates concerning the substance and processes characterising the EU's external action by positing that the idea of a Market Power Europe whereby the EU's single market is identified as the EU's main source of power in international relations as well the most important means through which such power is exercised 18 . Much like Normative Power Europe, the notion of Market Power Europe ascribes a sui generis identity to the EU, which it supposedly seeks to project abroad in the context of its foreign policy actions.
However, contrary to Normative Power Europe, this identity is not based on a set of core norms and values but rather the prominence of a large regulated and integrated market. The distinction is significant as it means that although the EU remains a keen exporter of rules, it is not shackled to a closed set of substantive norms or values. For example, as Damro points out, whereas under Normative Power Europe, trade liberalization is linked to the core norm of liberty, under Market Power Europe, the EU can promote any policy or measure which reflect the preferences of the single market, including "market interventions via economic and social regulation" 19 .
At the root of this power is the magnitude of the single market. The EU is the biggest exporter of goods and services and the largest host of foreign investment in the world. The attractiveness of the market creates an incentive for States to converge their standards to those applied in the EU so as to reduce market access impediments institutional framework built to weigh up varying and often-conflicting interests in the adoption of policies and regulation. This "regulatory capacity" 21 of the EU includes the ability to take into account the international dimension of regulatory measures (e.g., effect of EU rules on third countries, sanctions for non-compliance and interplay between domestic measures and international law) 22 . Finally, the decision-making process underpinning the adoption of EU rules allows for the participation of non-state actors, which allows interest groups to play a significant role in the externalization of EU regulation. Damro contends that these three inherent features of the single market create a basis for the EU's identity as a market power 23 . In other words, the EU is ontologically prone to the externalization of EU market rules and policies, just as, under Normative Power Europe, the EU seems predisposed to project its normative foundations. However, the key difference is that, in Market Power Europe, there are no ethical or value based undertones to its external action. The EU's foreign policy goals do not depart significantly from those of traditional powers and they are certainly not understood by reference to its attachment to universal norms or values or a preference towards cooperative forms of action. Instead, it is a limitation -that is, its over-reliance on its economic power, that sets its apart from the rest.
WTO Dispute Settlement as a tool for the externalization of EU policy and rules
The EU has historically been one of the main proponents of the multilateral trading system. It played a pivotal role in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO and has, since, consistently pushed for the inclusion of further disciplines and the expansion of the organisation. One of the main reasons underlying the EU's preference for the WTO as a rule-setting forum is that it offers an adjudicatory system that can issue legally binding and enforceable rulings 24 . In other words, the attractiveness of the WTO as a The importance attached by the EU to the WTO Dispute settlement Mechanism seems to fit neatly with the idea of a Civilian Power Europe or a Normative Power Europe keen to conduct a foreign policy within the confines of international law and institutions. Indeed, the EU is one of the most prolific litigators in the WTO and has one of the best track records in terms of compliance with WTO rulings 26 . However, the EU's compliance with WTO rules can, to a large extent, be explained by the fact that was one of the main architects of the multilateral trading system, WTO rules tend to reflect its own approach to market regulation. And whilst a number of studies have shown that although the EU does make efforts to ensure that its laws are WTO compliant, the fear of adverse rulings is not always at the forefront of the minds of EU decision makers when considering whether to adopt a piece of legislation 27 . In other words, whilst the EU portrays itself as a promoter of international law and effective multilateralism, it is certainly not averse to going it alone in order to pursue its interests or safeguards its preferences.
However, this strand of research has focused on the impact of WTO law and rulings on the decision-making processes of EU regulators. Curiously, less research has been undertaken to assess the extent to which the EU uses the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to spread the reach of its influence abroad. Yet, there is increasing evidence that policy makers in Brussels see the WTO's adjudicatory system as an important tool to promote its interests and regulatory positions abroad. This is best exemplified by the European Commission's 2006 Communication, "Global Europe: Competing in the world" ("Global Europe strategy") 28 which
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The following section examines two case studies that illustrate how the EU uses the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and, in some cases, incorporates WTO litigation into its own domestic policy and regulatory frameworks, to project its interest and norms abroad. The first case study concerns the EU's current external policy designed to ensure access to exhaustible mineral resources -a policy that expressly identifies WTO litigation as a route to achieve its objective and which has resulted in two challenges being brought against trade restrictive measures adopted by China with respect to raw materials and rare earths. The second subsection examines the EU's current regulatory regime banning trade in seal fur produced under inhumane conditions which was, itself, the subject of a recent challenge before the WTO. Through these cases, it will be shown that the EU sees WTO dispute settlement as a means to secure its objectives and promote its own values and norms, and that the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not reflect an attachment to or preference for the multilateral process, rather that the EU will assess all available policy options available to it (e.g., unilateralism, cooperation, WTO dispute settlement) and opt for the one that one which is more likely to successfully achieve its objectives.
The EU's Mineral Resources Policy

EU Raw Materials Initiative
The increasing volatility of commodity prices caused by the growing influence of finance as well as the surge in demand for already scarce mineral resources from emerging economies led the EU to develop its Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) -an integrated strategy designed to secure sustainable access to nonenergy and non-agricultural raw materials. The 'raw materials' covered by the RMI are metals and minerals that are typically sourced from specific geographical locations, have few substitutes and are used for the manufacture of high-technology products and in the environmental sector and have few substitutes 30 . Together, these factors mean that the countries producing such materials can successfully control global prices by limiting production or exports. This is effectively what occurred in 2007-2008, where the application of export restraints (whether in the form of tariffs, export taxes or quantitative restrictions, or minimum purchase prices) by producers China has been the one of the main targets of the RMI. It is a mineral resource rich country that has strategically used export restraints to create a competitive advantage for domestic downstream producers who rely on raw materials 33 . This has been achieved, on the one hand, by restricting the supply of raw materials to foreign firms which, increases global prices and therefore undermines the ability of foreign firms to compete 34 and, on the other hand, by ensuring that Chinese state-owned enterprises and domestic producers have access to raw materials at below market prices. 35 With respect to China, to the extent that a trade agreement remains an unlikely prospect in the short to medium term, the RMI has materialized mainly though two WTO disputes involving export restraints.
Raw Materials and Rare Earths disputes
The EU has launched two separate complaints against China regarding various export restraints on the exportation of certain mineral resources. In the first of these disputes, China -Measures relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials ("Raw Materials") 36 , the EU, along with the United States and Mexico, lodged a complaint in 2009 against the application of quotas, export duties, minimum export prices on raw materials such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium and manganese as well as additional requirements and procedures that must be fulfilled by exporters of such materials. The second dispute, China -Measures relating to the exportation of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum ("Rare Earths") concerned export restraints relating to so-called "rare earths" -17 metals with specific chemical, magnetic and fluorescent properties and used in the manufacture of high technology goods such as telephones, computers and televisions 37 . In both cases, China has argued that the export restrictions were needed in order to manage what are non-renewable and rapidly dwindling natural resources. China holds the largest national reserve of rare earths accounting for approximately 9.5% of global supply, and has argued that at the current rate of exploitation its supply of rare earths will be exhausted within 30 years. Based on this, it has adopted a number of policies designed to reduce the production of rare earths in a manner that would not adversely impact its domestic industry 38 .
The export restrictions imposed by China were challenged on various grounds. Firstly, the complainants claimed that the quotas and minimum export prices violated a number of GATT obligations, most notably, Article XI GATT requiring all WTO Members to eliminate prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on exports. Secondly, it was claimed that the imposition of export duties on raw materials covered by the dispute was inconsistent with Article 11.3 of China's
Measures"Related"to"the"Exportation"of"Various" Raw"Materials,!WT/DS394/R,!5!July!2001;!Appellate!Body!report,!China"-" Measures"Related"to"the"Exportation"of"Various"Raw"Materials, ! the EU with China, the evidence so far is that little progress has been made in terms of establishing common ground on issues pertaining to raw materials. 46 In this sense, the place of pride occupied by WTO dispute settlement in the context of the RMI reflects in part the inability of the EU to effectively wield its market power against China.
Seal Products Trade Ban
EU Seal Trade Regulation
The plight of seals has been an ongoing concern for animal activists within the EU for the better part of the last fifty years. Whilst a EU-wide ban on the import of seal pups furs and fur skin products had been in place since 1983, this regulation was not thought to have gone far enough by certain Member States who decided to By the EU's own admission the regulation was not adopted to ensure the conservation of an endangered species since the world seal population has steadily increased over the years. Rather, the ban sought to protect and promote European values regarding animal welfare and, in particular, to reflect the abhorrence generally felt by the EU population towards products derived from seals killed under inhumane conditions 50 . The Regulation was based on a scientific opinion delivered by the European Food Safety Authority, which found that the regulatory and management systems for seal hunting varied significantly from one State to another and that there was evidence that in in some cases the manner in which the killing is practice "causes avoidable pain, distress and other forms of suffering" 51 .
The overarching aim pursued by this internal legislative measure is to discipline the regulatory environment and practices of non-EU States involved seal hunting: access to the EU's internal market is made contingent upon compliance with established standards relating to the effective killing of seals. This is a clear illustration of how the EU acts as a market power, using the size of its internal market to trigger regulatory reform in third countries wishing to do business in the EU. It also reinforces the idea that, rather than having a preference towards cooperative processes in international relations, the EU will readily pursue the unilateral route where this option is more amenable to its immediate interests. For example, in the impact assessment conducted in 2008 on the impact of the trade ban on seal products, the European Commission considered the possibility of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements to promote higher animal welfare standards as an alternative to an outright ban. At the time, this option may have appeared preferable, as the EU was about to initiate negotiations on an important trade deal with Canada 52 , the largest seal-hunting nation and the one which stood most to lose from the ban. An outright EU ban on trade in seal products was not viewed kindly by Canada, which had made no secret of its intention to challenge any such measure before the WTO dispute settlement body 53 -and may have scuppered the negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement. However, because of the importance attached to securing access to the EU's internal market (the EU is Canada's second largest trading partner), the EU felt fairly secure in its assumption that the unilateral imposition of an added regulatory burden on Canada would not be sufficient to cause the collapse of negotiations 54 . Therefore, the EU had no qualms in resorting to unilateral action to force regulatory reform abroad since, in addition to being the most effective way of achieving its aims, this option would not cause any significant adverse impact to the European economy.
EU -Seal Products dispute
Canada and Norway challenged the Regulation arguing, inter alia, that the exemption of hunts conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities from its scope violated Articles I (most favoured nation obligation), III (national treatment obligation and XI GATT (elimination of quantitative restrictions) as it de facto to protect public morals (i.e "standards of right or wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or a nation") is allowed provided that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. The proposed measure is not discriminatory, as the various prohibitions to be provided for will apply to intra-Community trade as well as to imports and exports. 56 The key question thus addressed successively by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body concerned whether the ban could be justified under the public morals exception of Article XX(a) GATT. In order to do so, the EU had to demonstrate that the ban was designed to protect public morals, that it was necessary to achieve these objectives and that it satisfied the requirements under the Article XX GATT chapeau prohibiting measures the measure from being arbitrary, unjustifiable, or a disguised restriction on international trade. In casu, both the Panel
EUXMeasures" Prohibiting" the" Importation" and" Marketing" of" Seal" Products! WT/DS400/AB/R! 25,! November! 2013;! Appellate! Body! report," EUXMeasures" Prohibiting" the" Importation" and" Marketing" of" Seal" Products! WT/DS400/AB/R,!22!May!2014.! 56 and the Appellate Body sided with the EU's contention that the ban could be justified under Article XX(a). Firstly, with regards to the question of whether the protection of seal welfare was a legitimate public moral concerned covered by Article XX(a) GATT, the Panel found that that the "concept of public morals is a relative term which needs to be defined based on the standard of right and wrong in a given society" 57 and, that in the particular context of this dispute it had been established that "the concerns of the EU public on animal welfare involve standards of right and wrong within the European Union as a community" 58 . Secondly, the Panel agreed that the ban was necessary to protect public morals insofar as was deemed "capable of making and does actually make a contribution" to the achievement of addressing public moral concerns as it "prevents to a certain extent the EU public from being exposed to and participating as consumers in commercial activities related to the products derived from seals that may have been killed inhumanely [and] also appears to have the effect of negatively impacting the global demand for seal product". However, it was also found that the EU seals regime failed to satisfy the requirements under the chapeau of Article XX GATT chapeau since the discrimination entailed in the IC and MFM exemptions were found to be arbitrary or unjustifiable. For example, that the panel rejected that the regulatory distinction operated between commercial and IC hunts in Greenland, because, in practice, the manner in which Inuit hunts were conducted in Greenland bore all the hallmarks of large scale commercial hunts.
In sum, although certain elements of the Regulation and the Implementing Regulation (e.g., IC exemption) were found to violate WTO law, the EU-Seal Products ruling confirmed that the trade ban itself could be justified because it sought to protect public morals commonly held by the EU's population. In doing so, the ruling recognized the importance of pluralism and the right of WTO Members to regulate in accordance with their particular value systems which, given the wide membership of the organization, can vary significantly from one country to another 59 .
Clearly, EU -Seal Products can be seen as an evidence of the WTO's deference towards the regulatory and cultural diversity that characterizes its membershiptrade restrictive measures may be adopted so long as they genuinely reflect cultural values, even where these are not necessarily shared by other WTO Members 60 . It is somewhat ironic then that the upshot of a ruling intended to recognize regulatory European consumers are not faced with products derived from seals killed under inhumane conditions, but it is also designed to strong-arm third countries that wish to continue selling seal products in the lucrative EU internal market to change their regulatory systems in accordance with the EU's domestic preferences. Indeed, even before bringing the case before thw WTO's judicature, Canada had taken steps to reform its seal hunt laws to ward off the threat of the EU trade ban 61 .
The regime thus illustrates a particular manifestation of what Scott refers to as the 'international orientation' of EU lawmaking and its approach to norm exportation -the EU enacts laws, which require compliance with its own standards in order to extend market access to third countries, but ensures that such unilateralism is consistent with international law 62 . The EU Seal Regime may have been primarily driven by strong domestic political preferences but by anticipating the possibility of a WTO challenge and by designing the relevant regulations in line with WTO law, the EU has sought to ensure that the external repercussions of these regulations are not undermined by adverse WTO rulings. In this sense, rather than being a constraint on regulatory autonomy, WTO law furthers the EU's policy agenda and, in particular, external policy objectives pursued by EU domestic legislation.
Questioning the distinctiveness of the EU as an international actor
Both the RMI and the EU ban on trade in seals can be used as examples of the how the EU acts as a normative power. In both cases the EU has a devised policy or regulatory framework which is intend to promote certain foundational normative values abroad. With regard to the RMI, the goal of securing market access to key mineral resources can be linked to the EU's attachment to economic freedoms that underpin the functioning of the internal market. The EU trade in seals ban intends to protect and promote EU environmental standards and, more generally, sustainable development goals. Furthermore, the reliance on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the efforts undertaken by EU legislators to ensure WTO compliance of EU domestic legislation underlines the EU's commitment to the rule of law and Here again, it must be pointed out that compliance is to a large extent a byproduct of ! 22! the fact that WTO reflects the norms, values and interests of the EU. Even so, in the few instances where EU measures have been found to violate WTO law, there are cases where the EU has chosen against compliance where this would run counter to its immediate interests 68 . Overall, the foregoing paints a picture of the EU that corresponds to that of the stereotypical exemptionalist: an international actor that shapes and enforces the rules of the international legal system but seeks "to insulate itself from the domestic blowback of […] the multilateral instruments it has created" 69
All this, of course, is not to say that the EU's modus operandi as an international trade actor is identical to that of other international actors. As discussed above, the norms and values promoted by the EU in the WTO are in many instances specific to it. Likewise, the sui generis nature of the EU's regulatory process means that it is better placed than most to design measures that not only comply with international law but also contribute to the furtherance of the EU's foreign policy goals. In this respect, the two case studies examined in this paper have put the spotlight on a particularly interesting feature of the EU's role in shaping WTO lawthat is, that the potential for WTO litigation is increasingly taken into account by the EU in the process of developing policies and regulatory measures as a tool to export EU interests, norms and values. These features of the EU's external action, in realm of the international trading system, however novel, reflect shared values amongst EU Members States as well as the institutional specificities of the EU's regulatory processes.
Conclusion
This article has examined the EU's relationship with the WTO -and more specifically its approach to WTO litigation -to debunk identity narratives, such as
Normative Power Europe, that present the EU as distinctive foreign policy actor ontologically predisposed to project of universal norms or values and to eschew coercion or unilateralism in favour of cooperative forms of action. The EU was a major force behind the conclusion of the WTO agreements and has subsequently shaped the evolution of its rules in the context of the negotiation of WTO accession agreements as well as through its participation in WTO litigation. In doing so, the EU has ensured that the WTO represents a legal order that reflects the EU's foreign policy objectives. However, whether it is in securing old-fashioned free trade imperatives of opening foreign markets or disseminating rules, these objectives remain very much Euro-centric and do not necessarily underpin any form of attachment towards universal norms and values. In the same vein, although the EU does appear to be committed to cooperation in the context of its international relationships, the strength of this commitment will vary from one case to another depending on its interests. The EU has put the WTO at the forefront of its policy designed to open foreign markets for mineral resources because it knows it has little leverage against the key producers of such commodities. Conversely, with respect to its ban on products derived from seal hunts, the EU carefully scrutinized the various policy options available to it (which included the possibility of negotiating agreements with States currently engaged in seal hunting practices) but opted for a unilateral action because its significant economic leverage over the offending countries would be the most effective way of forcing their hand.
The source of the EU's power -its reliance on economic or 'market' poweris the only truly distinctive aspect of its power. However, the reliance on its market and regulatory power is not the result of a choice but purely reflects the fact that as a supranational organization based on economic integration, the EU's internal market remains its most effective tool to exert influence abroad. In this sense the use of market power is purely the byproduct of the EU's own internal limitations. Beyond this, there is fundamentally nothing that is inherently unique about the EU's external trade action. It attempts to protect and promote its interests by shaping the international community and legal order in its own image. This is the archetypal modus operandi of great foreign policy powers -the desire to set the rules of the game in a manner that both promote your values and interests whilst, simultaneously, shielding that power from the adverse consequences of such rules.
The manner in which the power is exercised is also indistinctive. The EU is pragmatic in its choice of tools. It will use existing international fora to pursue foreign policy goals when this suits its interests, but will also readily pursue other options that may be more effective in securing those interests.
